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Abstract
Cloud computing systems, in which clients rent and share computing resources of third party platforms, have gained widespread
use in recent years. Furthermore, cloud computing for mobile systems (i.e., systems in which the clients are mobile devices) have
too been receiving considerable attention in technical literature. We propose a new method of delegating computations of resource-
constrained mobile clients, in which multiple servers interact to construct an encrypted program known as garbled circuit. Next,
using garbled inputs from a mobile client, another server executes this garbled circuit and returns the resulting garbled outputs.
Our system assures privacy of the mobile client’s data, even if the executing server chooses to collude with all but one of the
other servers. We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver et al. and the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich
et al. for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing for mobile systems. Our method incorporates the novel use of the
cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator of Blum et al. that enables the mobile client to eﬃciently retrieve the
result of the computation, as well as to verify that the evaluator actually performed the computation. We analyze the server-side and
client-side complexity of our system. Using real-world data, we evaluate our system for a privacy preserving search application that
locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. We also measure the time taken to construct and evaluate the garbled circuit
for varying number of servers, demonstrating the feasibility of our secure and veriﬁable cloud computing for mobile systems.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing systems, in which the clients rent and share computing resources of third party platforms such as
Amazon Elastic Cloud, Microsoft Azure, etc., have gained widespread use in recent years. Provisioned with a large
pool of hardware and software resources, these cloud computing systems enable clients to perform computations on a
vast amount of data without setting up their own infrastructure1. However, providing the cloud service provider with
the client data in plaintext form to carry out the computations will result in complete loss of data privacy.
Homomorphic encryption2 is an approach to tackle the problem of preserving data privacy, which can allow the
cloud service providers to perform speciﬁc computations directly on the encrypted client data, without requiring
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private decryption keys. Recently, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes (e.g., Gentry et al. 3) have been pro-
posed, which enable performing any arbitrary computation on encrypted data. However, FHE schemes are currently
impractical for mobile cloud computing applications due to extremely large cipher text size. For instance, to achieve
128-bit security, the client is required to exchange a few Giga bytes of ciphertext with the cloud server, for each bit of
the plain text message3. Thus, there is a need for a more eﬃcient alternative, which is suitable for mobile systems.
Yao’s garbled circuits approach4,5, which we consider in our work, is a potential alternative to FHE schemes that
can drastically reduce the ciphertext size. Any computation can be represented using a Boolean circuit, for which,
there exists a corresponding garbled circuit 4,5,6,7. Each gate in a garbled circuit can be unlocked using a pair of input
wire keys that correspond to the underlying plaintext bits; and the association between the wire keys and the plaintext
bits is kept secret from the cloud server that performs the computation. Unlocking a gate using a pair of input wire
keys reveals an output wire key, which, in turn, serves as an input wire key for unlocking the subsequent gate in the
next level of the circuit. Thus, garbled circuits can enable oblivious evaluation of any arbitrary function, expressible
as a Boolean circuit, on a third-party cloud server.
While garbled circuits preserve the privacy of client data, they are, however, one time programs – using the same
version of the circuit more than once compromises the garbled circuit and reveals to an adversarial evaluator whether
the semantics have changed or remained the same for a set of input and output wires between successive evaluations.
Expecting the client to create a new version of the garbled circuit for each evaluation, however, is an unreasonable
solution, since creating a garbled circuit is at least as expensive as evaluating the underlying Boolean circuit! Thus,
in contrast to FHE schemes such as that of Gentry3, that can directly delegate the desired computation to the cloud
servers, a scheme using garbled circuits, presents the additional challenge of eﬃciently delegating to the cloud servers
the creation of garbled circuit.
We propose a new method, in which whenever the client needs to perform a computation, it employs a number
of cloud servers to create a new version of the garbled circuit in a distributed manner. Each server generates a set
of private input bits using unique seed value from the client and interacts with all the other servers to create a new
garbled circuit, which is a function of the private input bits of all the servers. Essentially, the servers engage in a secure
multiparty computation protocol (e.g., Goldreich et al. 6,7) to construct the desired garbled circuit without revealing
their private inputs to one another. Once a new version of the garbled circuit is created using multiple servers, the client
delegates the evaluation to an arbitrary server in the cloud. The resulting version of the garbled circuit, the garbled
inputs that can unlock the circuit, and the corresponding garbled outputs, remain unrecognizable to the evaluator, even
if it chooses to collude with any strict-subset of servers that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit.
Our proposed system is designed to readily exploit the real-world asymmetry that exists between typical mobile
clients and cloud servers – while the mobile clients are resource-constrained, the cloud servers, on the other hand, are
suﬃciently provisioned to perform numerous intensive computation and communication tasks. To achieve secure and
veriﬁable computing capability, our system requires very little computation and communication involvement from
the mobile client beyond the generation and exchange of compact cipher text messages. However, using signiﬁcantly
larger resources, the cloud servers can eﬃciently generate and exchange a large volume of random bits necessary for
carrying out the delegated computation. Thus, our proposed scheme is very suitable for mobile environments.
We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver, Micali, Rogaway (BMR8,9), and the secure multiparty computation
protocol of Goldreich et al. 6,7 to suit them for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing system. To facilitate
the construction of the garbled circuit, and also to enable the client to eﬃciently retrieve and verify the result of the
computation, our method incorporates the novel use of the cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator
of Blum, Blum, Shub10,11, whose strength relies on the computational diﬃculty of factorizing large numbers into
primes. Our proposed system enables the client to eﬃciently verify that the evaluator actually and fully performed the
requested computation.
Our major contributions in this work include the following: (i) we design a secure mobile cloud computing system
using multiple servers that enables the client to delegate any arbitrary computation, (ii) our system assures the privacy
of the client input and the result of the computation, even if the evaluating server colludes with all but one of the servers
that created the garbled circuit, (iii) our system enables the client to eﬃciently recover the result of the computation
and to verify whether the evaluator actually performed the computation, (iv) we present an analysis of the server-side
and client-side complexity of our proposed scheme. Our ﬁndings show that in comparison to Gentry’s FHE scheme,
our scheme uses very small cipher text messages suitable for mobile clients, (v) using real-world data, we evaluate our
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Fig. 1: Our secure cloud computing model with a mobile client using (n + 2) = 5 servers, {p1, p2, p3, pc, pe}.
system for a privacy preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client, and (vi)
we measure the time taken to construct and evaluate the garbled circuit for varying number of servers, demonstrating
the feasibility of our system.
2. A High-level Overview of our System
In the proposed system, the client employs a set of (n + 2) servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}. Initially, the client
sends a description of the desired computation (e.g., addition of two numbers), and a unique seed value si to each
server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Each of these n servers ﬁrst creates (or retrieves from its repository, if available already)
a Boolean circuit (B) that corresponds to the requested computation. Using the unique seed value si, each server
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) generates a private pseudorandom bit sequence whose length is proportional to the total number of
wires in the Boolean circuit (B). Then, using the private pseudorandom bit sequences and the Boolean circuit (B) as
inputs, these n servers interact with one another and perform some local computations according to a secure multiparty
computation protocol, to create their shares (GCi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n)) for an one-time program called garbled circuit.
Once the shares for the garbled circuit are created, the client requests each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), to send its
share, GCi, to the server pc. Performing an XOR operation on these shares, the server pc creates the desired circuit,
GC = GC1⊕GC2⊕ . . .⊕GCn. Subsequently, the client instructs the server pc to send the garbled circuitGC to another
server pe for evaluation.
Now, using the unique seed values si, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the client generates on its own garbled input values for each input
wire in the circuit and sends them to the server pe for evaluation. Using these garbled inputs, the server pe unlocks
the gates in the ﬁrst level of the circuit to obtain the corresponding garbled outputs, which, in turn, unlocks the gates
in the second level of the circuit, and so on. In this manner, the server pe unlocks all the gates in the circuit, obtains
the garbled outputs of the circuit, and sends them to the client. The client now converts these garbled output values
into plaintext bits to recover the result of the desired computation. Fig. 1 depicts an overview of our proposed system.
2.1. Our Adversary Model
We assume the existence of a secure communication channel between the client and each of the (n + 2) servers,
{p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}, for sending unique seed values for pseudorandom bit generation, identity of the other servers,
etc. We assume that all pairs of communicating servers authenticate one another. We assume a very capable adversary,
where the evaluator pe may individually collude with any proper subset of the n servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, and still
remain unable to determine the semantics of any garbled value that the evaluator observes during evaluation. Thus,
our adversary model depicts a very realistic scenario – where the client may be certain that some (however, not all)
of the parties are corrupt, however, it is uncertain which of the parties are corrupt. If any adversarial party attempts
to eavesdrop and analyze the set of all message exchanges between diﬀerent parties, and also analyze the set of all
the messages that it has legitimately received from the other parties, it still cannot determine the shares of the other
parties, or the semantics of the garbled value pairs that are assigned to each wire in the circuit. Further, if the evaluator,
pe, returns arbitrary numbers as outputs to the client, the client can detect this eﬃciently. In our model, a new garbled
circuit is created for every evaluation. This prevents an adversarial evaluator from determining the set of inputs and
outputs that have changed or remained the same between diﬀerent evaluations.
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3. Secure and Veriﬁable Cloud Computing for Mobile Systems
In this section, we brieﬂy present how we use, adapt, and combine the various cryptographic constructions, as well
as present a summary of our proposed system.
3.1. Oblivious Transfer Protocol
There are two parties, a sender and a chooser. The sender holds four private messages, M00, M01, M10, M11, and
the chooser holds two private choice bits, σ1, σ2. At the end of the 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer (OT) protocol12,13,
the chooser learns Mσ1σ2 only, while the sender learns nothing.
Essentially, the sender and chooser use their private messages and choice bits as inputs to perform a small constant
number of pseudorandom function computations such as AES, SHA, modular arithmetic operations in a multiplicative
sub-group of Z∗p, where p is a safe-prime, and interact with one another to realize the OT functionality12,13.
3.2. Secure Multiparty Computation Protocol
We brieﬂy describe the secure multipary computation protocol of Goldreich6,7, which allows n parties to compute
any arbitrary function of their private inputs, namely f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) without revealing their private inputs to one
another. Assume that f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is expressed as a Boolean circuit (B′) using a set of XOR and AND gates.
Splitting and sharing: For each wire in the Boolean circuit, the actual binary value corresponds to the XOR-sum
of shares of all the n parties. In the original protocol, each party splits and shares each of its private input bits with
all the other parties over pairwise secure communication channels. In our approach, we eliminate this communication
using a unique seed value sik that the client shares with all pairs of parties, (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n). To split and
share each of its m private input bits xi j, (1 ≤ j ≤ m), party pi generates rk j, (∀k  i), using the seed value sik.
More speciﬁcally, party pi sets its own share as xi j
⊕n
k=1,ki rk j, where rk j = R(sik, j, gateid, entryid) corresponds to
the output of the pseudorandom bit generator using the seed value sik for the jth private input bit of party pi, for a
speciﬁc garbled table entry (entryid) of one of the gates (gateid) in the circuit. Likewise, party pk sets its own share as
rk j = R(sik, j, gateid, entryid). Thus, our approach eliminates the exchange of a very large number of bits.
XOR gates: Evaluation of each XOR gate in the circuit is carried out locally. Speciﬁcally, each party merely
performs an XOR operation over its shares for the two input wires to obtain its share for the output wire.
AND gates: Evaluation of each AND gate in the circuit, on the other hand, requires interaction between all pairs
of parties. For the two inputs wires to the AND gate, let ai, bi denote the shares of party pi; and let a j, b j denote the
shares of party p j. Then, the XOR-sum of the shares for the output wire of the AND gate is expressed as follows:
(
⊕n
i=1 ai).(
⊕n
i=1 bi) = [
⊕
1≤i< j≤n((ai ⊕ a j).(bi ⊕ b j))]
⊕n
i=1((ai.bi).I), where I = n mod 2.
Each party pi locally computes ((ai.bi).I); and the computation of each partial-product, ((ai ⊕ a j).(bi ⊕ b j)), is
accomplished using 1-out-of-4 OT12,13 between pi and p j, such that no party reveals its shares to the other party6,7.
Following the above procedure, the n parties evaluate every gate in the circuit. Thus, in the end, each server
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), obtains the share, ( f (x1, x2, . . . , xn))i, such that f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
⊕n
i=1( f (x1, x2, . . . , xn))i.
3.3. Garbled Circuits – for Secure Computation
In the following, we describe the construction and evaluation of the garbled circuit, GC. In our work, we use an
enhanced variant of the original Yao’s garbled circuits4,5, namely, the garbled circuit design from Beaver, Micali,
Rogaway (BMR8,9), and adapt it for the purpose of building a secure and veriﬁable cloud computing system.
3.3.1. Construction of GC
Garbled Value Pairs: Each wire in the circuit is associated with a pair of garbled values representing the underlying
plaintext bits 0 and 1. Let A denote a speciﬁc gate in the circuit, whose two input wires are x, y; and whose output
wire is z. Let (α0, α1), (β0, β1) and (γ0, γ1) denote the pair of garbled values associated with the wires x, y and z,
respectively. Note that LS B(α0) = LS B(β0) = LS B(γ0) = 0 and LS B(α1) = LS B(β1) = LS B(γ1) = 1.
Each garbled value is (nk+1) bits long, where n denotes the number of servers and k denotes the security parameter.
Essentially, each garbled value is a concatenation of shares from the n servers. Let a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Then the garbled val-
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ues are expressed as follows: αa = αa1||αa2||αa3|| . . . ||αan||a; βb = βb1||βb2||βb3|| . . . ||βbn||b; γc = γc1||γc2||γc3|| . . . ||γcn||c;
where αai, βbi, γci are shares of server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
λ Value: Each wire in the circuit is also associated with a 1-bit λ value that determines the semantics for the pair of
garbled values. Speciﬁcally, the garbled value whose LS B = b represents the underlying plaintext bit (b ⊕ λ).
Collusion Resistance: Let λx, λy, λz denote the λ values for the wires x, y, z respectively. Then, λx =
⊕n
i=1 λxi,
λy =
⊕n
i=1 λyi, λz =
⊕n
i=1 λzi, where λxi, λyi, λzi are shares of server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Note that the λ value of each
wire is unknown to any individual server. Consequently, the evaluator of the garbled circuit must collude with all the
n servers to interpret the garbled values.
Garbled Table: Each gate, A, in the circuit, is associated with an ordered list of four values, [A00, A01, A10, A11],
which represents the garbled table for gate A. Let ⊗ ∈ {XOR, AND} denote the binary operation of gate A. Then, the
value of one speciﬁc entry, Aab = γ[((λx⊕a)⊗(λy⊕b))⊕λz] ⊕ [Gb(αa1)⊕Gb(αa2)⊕ . . .⊕Gb(αan)]⊕ [Ga(βb1)⊕Ga(βb2)⊕ . . .⊕
Ga(βbn)], where Ga and Gb are pseudorandom functions that expand k bits into (nk+ 1) bits. Speciﬁcally, let G denote
a pseudorandom generator, which on providing a k-bit input seed, outputs a sequence of (2nk + 2) bits, i.e., if |s| = k,
then |G(s)| = (2nk+2). G may represent the output of AES block cipher in output feedback mode, for example. Then,
G0(s) and G1(s) denote the ﬁrst and last (nk + 1) bits of G(s) respectively.
To compute a garbled table entry Aab, such as the one shown above, the n servers use the secure multiparty com-
putation protocol of Goldreich6,7 (Section 3.2), where f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = Aab, and for each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), its
private input, xi = [λxi, λyi, λzi,Gb(αai),Ga(βbi), γ0i, γ1i] is a vector of length m = (3 + 2(nk + 1) + 2k) bits. In this
manner, the n servers jointly compute each entry in the garbled table for each gate in the circuit.
3.3.2. Evaluation of GC
Let α, β denote the garbled values for the two input wires of a gate A during evaluation. Let a, b denote the LSB
values of α, β respectively. Let the ordered list [A00, A01, A10, A11] denote the garbled table for gate A. Then, the
garbled value for the output wire, γ, is recovered using α, β, Aab, as shown in the two-step process below:
1. split the most signiﬁcant nk bits of α into n parts, α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn, each with k bits; similarly, split the most
signiﬁcant nk bits of β into n parts, β1, β2, β3, . . . , βn, each with k bits; i.e., |αi| = |βi| = k, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. compute γ = [Gb(α1) ⊕Gb(α2) ⊕ . . . ⊕Gb(αn)] ⊕ [Ga(β1) ⊕Ga(β2) ⊕ . . . ⊕Ga(βn)] ⊕ Aab.
Thus, the garbled output for any gate in the circuit can be computed using the garbled table and the two garbled
inputs to the gate. Note that while the construction of the garbled circuit requires interaction among all the n parties,
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the server pe can perform the evaluation independently.
3.4. Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generation – for Recovery and Veriﬁcation of Outputs
We address the following questions in this subsection. First, how does the client eﬃciently recover the result of the
computation without itself having to repeat the delegated computations? Second, how does the client verify that the
garbled circuit is actually evaluated? In other words, is it possible for the client to determine cheating if the evaluator
returns arbitrary numbers as output without carrying out any computation at all?
We can enable the client to eﬃciently retrieve and verify the outputs returned by the evaluator, pe. To achieve this,
each of the n parties that participates in the creation of the garbled circuit uses the cryptographically secure Blum,
Blum, Shub pseudorandom number generator10,11, as we have outlined below.
Let N denote the product of two large prime numbers, p, q, which are congruent to 3 mod 4. The client chooses
a set of n seed values, {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, where each seed value si belongs to Z∗N , the set of integers relatively prime
to N. The client sends the modulus value N and a unique seed value si to each party pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) over a secure
communication channel. However, the client keeps the prime factors, p, q, of N as a secret.
Let bi, j denote the jth bit generated by the party pi. Then, bi, j = LS B(xi, j), where xi, j = x2i,( j−1) mod N, and xi,0 = si.
Each wire ω in the circuit is associated with a pair of garbled values, (ω0, ω1), and a 1-bit λω value. Then,
ω0 = ω01||ω02||ω03|| . . . ||ω0n||0, ω1 = ω11||ω12||ω13|| . . . ||ω1n||1; and λω = λω1 ⊕ λω2 ⊕ λω3 ⊕ . . . ⊕ λωn. In these three
expressions, ω0i, ω1i and λωi are shares of the party pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Note that |ω0i| = |ω1i| = k, and |λωi| = 1.
For each wire ω, (0 ≤ ω ≤ W − 1), in the circuit, each party, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), needs to generate (2k + 1) pseudo
random bits, where W denotes the total number of wires in the circuit. Thus, each party, pi, generates a total of
(W(2k + 1)) pseudorandom bits.
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Party pi generates its shares ω0i, ω1i, and λωi for wire ω as a concatenation of the bi, j values, where the indices
j belong to the range: [(ω(2k + 1) + 1), (ω + 1)(2k + 1)]. For concise notation, let Ωωk = ω(2k + 1). Then, ω0i =
bi,(Ωωk+1)||bi,(Ωωk+2)|| . . . ||bi,(Ωωk+k), ω1i = bi,(Ωωk+k+1)||bi,(Ωωk+k+2)|| . . . ||bi,(Ωωk+2k), λωi = bi,(Ωωk+2k+1).
Short-cut: Notice that each party pi is required to compute all the previous ( j− 1) bits before it can compute the jth
bit. However, using its knowledge of the prime factors of N, i.e., p, q, the client can directly calculate any xi, j (hence,
the bit bi, j) using the relation: xi, j = x
2 jmodC(N)
i,0 mod N, where C(N) denotes the Carmichael function, which equals
the least common multiple of (p − 1) and (q − 1).
Recovery and Veriﬁcation: Therefore, using the secret values p, q, the client can readily compute ω0, ω1, and λω
for any output wire ω in the circuit; i.e., without having to compute ω0, ω1, and λω for any intermediate wire in the
circuit. Using the λω values for the output wires, the client can translate each of the garbled values returned by the
evaluator pe into a plaintext bit and recover the result of the requested computation. The client declares successful
output veriﬁcation only if the garbled output returned by the evaluator matches with either ω0 or ω1, for each output
wire ω of the circuit.
Collusion Resistance:Note that, without performing any computation, the evaluator can return one of the two actual
garbled outputs for each output wire in the circuit, if and only if it colludes with all the n servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, that
participated in the creation of the garbled circuit, or factorizes N into its prime factors, p and q, which is infeasible.
Unpredictability: Further, the Blum, Blum, Shub pseudorandom number generator guarantees that one cannot
predict the next/previous bit output from the generator, even with the knowledge of all the previous/future bits10,11.
Thus, based on the observations of the garbled values during evaluation, the evaluator cannot predict the preceding or
subsequent garbled values, or the λ values for any wire in the circuit.
3.5. Summary of our Proposed System
1. The client chooses a set of (n + 2) servers in the cloud, {p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}. Then, it provides a description of
the desired computation, and a unique seed value si to each server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). It also provides another seed
value sik to each pair of servers, (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n).
2. Each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), creates (or retrieves from its repository, if already available) a Boolean circuit (B)
that corresponds to the requested computation.
3. Each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), uses si to generate its shares for the pair of garbled values and a λ value for each
wire in the circuit (B) using the pseudo random generator of Blum, Blum, Shub.
Using seed si, each server, pi, generates a pseudorandom bit sequence whose length equals W(2k + 1), where W
denotes the total number of wires in the Boolean circuit (B).
4. The client instructs the n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), to use their shares as private inputs for the secure multiparty
computation protocol of Goldreich, to construct shares (GCi) of a BMR garbled circuit, GC.
While using the protocol of Goldreich, each pair of servers, (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n), generates pseudorandom bits
using pairwise seed values sik.
Let Ai = (A00)i||(A01)i||(A10)i||(A11)i denote the shares of server pi for the four garbled table entries of gate A.
Then, GCi, in turn, is a concatenation of all bit strings of the form Ai, where the concatenation is taken over all
the gates in the circuit.
5. The client instructs all n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to send their shares GCi to the server pc. Performing only XOR
operations, the server pc creates the desired circuit, GC = GC1 ⊕GC2 ⊕ . . . ⊕GCn. Now, the client instructs the
server pc to send the garbled circuit GC to server pe for evaluation.
6. Using the unique seed values si, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the client generates garbled input values for each input wire in the
circuit, and sends them to the server pe for evaluation. Using these seed values, the client also generates the λ
values and the two possible garbled values for each output wire in the circuit, and keeps them secret.
7. Using the garbled inputs, the server pe evaluates GC, and obtains the garbled outputs for each output wire in
the circuit and sends them to the client. Using the λ values, the client now translates these garbled values into
plaintext bits to recover the result of the requested computation.
8. The client checks whether the garbled output for each output wire in the circuit that is returned by the evaluator,
pe, matches with one of the two possible garbled values that it computed on its own. If there is a match for all
output wires, then the client declares that the evaluator in fact carried out the requested computation.
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6. Distance between the mobile client at an intersection ݔ௔ǡ ݕ௔  and 
any bank/ATM location ݔ௕ǡ ݕ௕  corresponds to the Manhattan 
distance metric, since the streets are arranged in a grid pattern. 
ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ ݔ௕ െ ݔ௔ ൅ ݕ௕ െ ݕ௔  
 
6. We create the Boolean circuit ܤ for the computation using a 
combination of SUB, ADD, CMP, MUX, and a tree of MIN blocks. 
 
7. Our circuit has ௑ܰǡ ஺ܰ XOR, AND gates respectively, where 
௑ܰ ൌ ͷ ݈ ൅ ͳ ൅ Ͷ݈ ൈ ܮ െ ͳ ൅ ͳͷ݈ ൅ ͳ ൈ ܮ ൌ ʹͷͻ͸, 
஺ܰ ൌ ʹ ݈ ൅ ͳ ൅ ʹ݈ ൈ ܮ െ ͳ ൅ Ͷ݈ ൈ ܮ ൌ ͺͷͶ. 
 
1. Problem: Find the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. 
 
2. Goal: preserve the privacy of: (i) mobile client’s input location,          
(ii) computed nearest bank/ATM location, (iii) computed distance. 
 
3. Case study: An area of Salt Lake City, UT consisting of 104 blocks, 
bounded by Main St., 1300 East St., South Temple St., 800 South St. 
 
4. Area consists of ܮ ൌ ͳͲ Chase, Well Fargo bank/ATM locations. 
 
5. Any East/South coordinate in this area represented using ݈ ൌ
݉ܽݔ ଶ ͳ͵ͲͲ ǡ ଶ ͺͲͲ ൌ ͳͳ bits. 
Fig. 2: Privacy preserving search application that ﬁnds the nearest bank/ATM location from the mobile client.
4. Results
4.1. Circuit size of one garbled table entry
In this section, we analyze the size of the Boolean circuit (B′) that computes one speciﬁc entry (Aab) in the garbled
table. Note that B′ is diﬀerent from B, which corresponds to the requested computation of the client (e.g., addition of
two numbers). While creating the garbled circuit GC, the n parties use the circuit B′ for the protocol of Goldreich to
compute each one of the four garbled table entries of the form Aab for each gate A in the circuit B.
Assume that each gate takes two input bits to produce one output bit. Recall from Section 3.3.1 that Aab =
γ[((λx⊕a)⊗(λy⊕b))⊕λz] ⊕ [Gb(αa1)⊕Gb(αa2)⊕ . . .⊕Gb(αan)]⊕ [Ga(βb1)⊕Ga(βb2)⊕ . . .⊕Ga(βbn)], where ⊗ ∈ {XOR, AND}
denotes the binary operation of gate A.
Let s = ((λx ⊕ a) ⊗ (λy ⊕ b)) ⊕ λz. Computing s requires a total of 3 + 3(n − 1) = 3n XOR gates and 1 ⊗ gate, since
λx =
⊕n
i=1 λxi, λy =
⊕n
i=1 λyi, λz =
⊕n
i=1 λzi, where λxi, λyi, λzi are shares of server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Boolean circuit B′ includes a multiplexer that chooses γs using the expression, γs = ((γ0 ⊕ γ1).s) ⊕ γ0, which is
composed of 2 XOR gates and 1 AND gate. Since |γ0| = |γ1| = nk + 1, and LS B(γs) = s, multiplexing is performed
on the most signiﬁcant nk bits. We can build this multiplexer using a total of 2nk XOR gates and nk AND gates.
Now, the expression γs ⊕ [Gb(αa1) ⊕ Gb(αa2) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Gb(αan)] ⊕ [Ga(βb1) ⊕ Ga(βb2) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Ga(βbn)] has (2n + 1)
terms, which are combined using 2n XOR operations. Since, each term has a length of (nk + 1) bits, computing this
expression requires a total of 2n(nk + 1) XOR gates.
To summarize, the Boolean circuit (B′) that computes one speciﬁc garbled table entry (Aab) has a total of (3n +
2nk + 2n(nk + 1)) XOR gates, nk AND gates, and 1 ⊗ gate. For example, when n = 6 and k = 128, the circuit that
computes Aab has a total of 10782 XOR and 769 AND gates. While the number of XOR gates increases quadratically
with n, the number of AND gates increases only linearly with n.
4.2. Server-side Cost
A 1-out-of-4 OT exchange between two parties involves the exchange of a small number of messages. Let s1:4
denote the total number of bits that are exchanged during a 1-out-of-4 OT. Then, s1:4 = 8(|p| + k)12,13. Note that |p|
and k are public and symmetric key security parameters, respectively. For example, |p| = 3072 achieves the equivalent
of k = 128-bit security14; in this case, s1:4 = 3200 bytes.
For each AND gate in the circuit B′, all possible pairs of the n servers, (pi, p j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, engage in a 1-out-
of-4 OT. Since the number of AND gates in the circuit B′ is at most (nk + 1), the total number of 1-out-of-4 OTs is
t1:4 = (nk + 1) × n(n − 1)/2.
At the completion of the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich, each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), sends
its share (Aab)i to another server, pc, to create the desired garbled table entry, Aab. Since |(Aab)i| = nk + 1, the server
pc receives a total of s = n(nk + 1) bits from the other n servers.
Therefore, to create one entry, Aab, the total amount of network traﬃc, T = (t1:4 × s1:4)+ s = (nk+ 1)[(4(|p|+ k)×
n(n − 1)) + n]. When the security parameters, k and |p|, are ﬁxed, the network traﬃc is a cubic function of n.
Let Ng denote the total number of gates in the circuit B that corresponds to the desired computation. Then, in the
process of creating the garbled circuit, GC, the total amount of network traﬃc equals 4Ng × T .
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Fig. 3: Server-side and client-cost for the privacy preserving search application that ﬁnds the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client.
Privacy preserving search for nearest bank/ATM: To evaluate our secure cloud computing approach for mobile
systems, we consider the privacy preserving search application of ﬁnding the nearest bank/ATM in Salt Lake City,
UT, which we have shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 shows the amount of network traﬃc to create the garbled circuit for this
application. For example, when n = 4, the cloud servers exchange about 126 GB of information to construct the
garbled circuit, which demonstrates feasibility of our approach for real-world privacy preserving computations.
4.3. Client-side Cost
To enable the creation of the garbled circuit, the client provides: (i) a unique seed value, si, to each server pi, (1 ≤
i ≤ n), and (ii) a seed value, sik, to each pair of servers (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n).
For the BBS PRNG, the length of each seed value, |si| = |N|. For the PRNG R, which can be implemented using a
block cipher such as AES in output feedback mode, the length of each seed is |sik | = k. Therefore, the total number of
bits that the client exchanges for the seed values is bs = n|N| + n(n − 1)k = n(|N| + (n − 1)k).
The client generates garbled input of length (nk+1) bits for each plaintext input bit to the circuit. Since the λ value
of a wire, in turn, depends on the 1-bit shares for the n parties, the number of bits that the client needs to generate for
each input wire equals bi = (nk + n).
To enable veriﬁcation of outputs, the client needs to generate both possible garbled outputs for each output wire.
Therefore, the number of bits that the client needs to generate for each output wire equals bo = (2nk + n).
To summarize, the client generates/exchanges a total of bs+Wi×bi+Wo×bo = n[|N|+(n−1)k+Wi(k+1)+Wo(2k+1)]
bits, where Wi and Wo denote the number of input and output wires, respectively, in the Boolean circuit B. In our
privacy preserving search application, Wi = 2l = 22 and Wo = 2l + l + 1 = 34. Fig. 3 shows the total number of kilo
bits that the client generates for the privacy preserving search for the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client.
Comparing the client-side and network-side costs from Fig. 3, we note that while the servers generate and exchange
Gigabytes of information to create the garbled circuit, the mobile client, on the other hand, generates and exchanges
only kilobytes of information with the evaluator and the other servers. For example, with n = 4 servers, the mobile
client generates and exchanges less than 60 kilo bits of information to preserve its location privacy. Furthermore, the
client-side cost grows much slowly with the number of servers, in comparison to the server-side cost.
4.4. Comparison of Our Scheme with Gentry’s FHE Scheme
While Gentry’s FHE scheme3 uses only one server, it, however, requires the client to exchange O(k5) bits with
the evaluating server, for each input and output wire of the circuit. In our secure cloud computing system, since each
garbled value has a length of (nk+1) bits, for each input and output wire, the client only exchanges O(nk) bits with the
server pe. For example, with k = 128, the size of each encrypted plain text bit equals several Gigabits with Gentry’s
scheme, while it equals a mere 641 bits in our approach with n = 5. Thus, our approach is far more practical for
cloud computing in mobile systems in comparison to FHE schemes.
4.5. Time Taken for Construction and Evaluation of Garbled Circuit
We implemented our secure cloud computing system using BIGNUM routines and crypto functions from the
OpenSSL library. We built our system as a collection of modules, and the servers communicate using TCP sockets.
482   Sriram N. Premnath and Zygmunt J. Haas /  Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  474 – 483 
2 3 4 5 60
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Ti
m
e 
ta
ke
n 
to
 c
on
st
ru
ct
 o
ne
ga
rb
le
d 
ta
bl
e 
(se
co
nd
s)
Number of parties (n)
2 3 4 5 6100
150
200
250
300
350
Ti
m
e 
ta
ke
n 
to
 e
va
lu
at
e 
on
e
ga
rb
le
d 
ga
te
 (m
illi 
se
co
nd
s)
Number of parties (n)
Fig. 4: (a) Time taken for constructing one garbled gate; (b) Time taken for evaluating one garbled gate.
We evaluated our system on a server with Intel Xeon 2.53 GHz processor, with 6 cores and 32 GB RAM. Fig. 4 shows
the time taken to construct one garbled table as a function of n. We note that the garbled tables for any number of
gates in the circuit can be constructed in parallel, which will signiﬁcantly reduce the construction time.
Fig. 4 also shows the time taken to evaluate one garbled gate as a function of n. We observe that evaluation is
signiﬁcantly faster than construction, where the latter can be done oﬄine. If the garbled circuits are pre-computed,
and made available to the evaluator, in advance, it can readily carry out the requested computation, and therefore,
drastically reduce the response time for the mobile client.
5. Related Work
Homomorphic encryption is an approach that enables performing computations directly on the encrypted data,
without requiring private decryption keys. For example, in the RSA public key system, the product of two ciphertext
messages produces a ciphertext corresponding to the product of the underlying plain text messages2. Domingo-Ferrer
et al. 15 present a homomorphic scheme that represents ciphertext as polynomials, allowing addition and multiplication
operations on the underlying plain text. Recently, proposed fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes (e.g.,
Gentry et al. 3) can perform any arbitrary computation on encrypted data. However, FHE schemes are currently
impractical for cloud computing applications due to extremely large cipher text size (Section 4.3).
Yao’s garbled circuits have been used in existing work in conjunction with oblivious transfer protocols for secure
two-party computation4,5,16. Lindell et al. 17 present an excellent survey of secure multiparty computation, along with
numerous potential applications, such as privacy preserving data mining, private set intersection, electronic voting
and electronic auction. A number of secure two-party and multiparty computation systems have been built over
the years (e.g., 18,19,20). Note that in secure multiparty computation systems multiple parties hold private inputs and
receive the result of the computation; however, in a secure cloud computing system, such as ours, while multiple
parties participate in the creation of garbled circuits, only the client holds private inputs and obtains the result of the
computation in garbled form. In our work, we adapt secure multiparty computation protocols6,7,8,9, for building a
secure and veriﬁable cloud computing for mobile systems.
Twin clouds21 is a secure cloud computing architecture, in which the client uses a private cloud for creating
garbled circuits and a public commodity cloud for evaluating them. Our solution, on the other hand, employs multiple
public cloud servers for creating as well as evaluating the garbled circuits. In other words, our solution obviates the
requirement of private cloud servers.
While FHE schemes currently remain impractical, they, however, oﬀer interesting constructions, such as reusable
garbled circuits22 and veriﬁable computing capabilities that permit a client to verify whether an untrusted server has
actually performed the requested computation23. In our proposed system, we enable the client to eﬃciently verify
whether an untrusted server has actually evaluated the garbled circuit, without relying on any FHE scheme.
Carter et al. 24 have proposed an atypical secure two party computation system with three participants: Alice,
Bob and a Proxy. In their work, Bob is a webserver that creates garbled circuits, and Alice is a mobile device that
delegates the task of evaluating the garbled circuits to the Proxy, which is a cloud server. We note that the computation
and adversary models in Carter et al.’s work are very diﬀerent from that of our work. First, in their work, being a
secure two party computation system, both Alice and Bob provide private inputs for the computation that they wish to
perform jointly; however, in our secure cloud computing model, only one party, i.e., the mobile client, provides inputs
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and obtains result of the computation in garbled form. Second, Cartel et al.’s scheme requires that neither Alice nor
Bob can collude with the Proxy; in a sharp contrast, our method preserves the privacy of the client data even if the
evaluating server colludes with all but one of the cloud servers that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit.
6. Concluding Remarks
We proposed a novel secure and veriﬁable cloud computing for mobile system using multiple servers. Our method
combines the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich et al. and the garbled circuit design of Beaver et
al. with the cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generation method of Blum et al. Our method preserves
the privacy of the mobile client’s inputs and the results of the computation, even if the evaluator colludes with all but
one of the servers that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit. Further, our method can eﬃciently detect
a cheating evaluator that returns arbitrary values as output without performing any computation. We presented an
analysis of the server-side and client-side complexity of our system. Using real-world data, we evaluated our system
for a privacy preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. We evaluated the
time taken to construct and evaluate a garbled circuit for varying number of servers, and demonstrated the feasibility
of our proposed approach.
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